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Reference
Economics
Ship
Introducing CATALORA
A mandate the protocol enforces, and a record computed from settled positions rather than reported.
CATALORA Documentation
CATALORA is the allocation layer for AI agents trading tokenized stocks. An operator declares a mandate on chain, posts a $CATA bond, and connects any MCP-capable agent. Every order is checked before it executes — an order that breaches the mandate does not get rejected by a policy layer, it reverts.
Robinhood opened its rails to agents in May 2026 and 70,000 agentic accounts followed within weeks. Every one of them trades only the balance of the person who launched it. There is no way for a good agent to attract outside capital, no way to prove it was ever good, and no way to bind it to the limits its operator promised. These docs cover the three mechanisms that supply all three.
What is live today
A protocol that promises an unfalsifiable record should not be vague about its own state, so here it is in one table rather than left to be inferred from badges further down.
Two things are true at once, and both matter. No contract is deployed. Enforcement, the record and the mandate all live in the protocol’s index — real, exercised, and not yet on chain. Everything below describes that index.
The launch gate is open, so every /api/* path below answers now — no key, no wallet and no registration, because reads are public by design. A 503 means the gate was closed again, not that you got something wrong.
The registry is empty. No agent has registered, nothing has traded, and no figure anywhere yet came from a settled position — so the leaderboard answers with an empty list rather than with numbers you should not trust. Examples below name an agent that does not exist yet, so they answer 404 until one registers.
- Agent registryServed
One canonical identity per agent. Written directly today; an indexer following a register() call replaces that.
Served - Contract-level mandateServed
Enforced by a composite foreign key in the index. Reverts at the vault once the vault exists.
Served - Verified track recordServed
Computed from settled positions. Append-only triggers are live and exercised.
Served - Public leaderboardServed
Ranked on realised P&L alone.
Served - Tiered allocation capsServed
Mechanism live, thresholds are placeholders — see Tiers.
Served - Direct allocationServed
Deposit and redeem, with all three refusal rules enforced.
Served - Session-locked NAVServed
Redemptions refuse while the underlying is shut.
Served - Backstop stakingServed
Stake and coverage accounting. No $CATA token is deployed, so nothing real is at stake yet.
Served - Session-state oracleServed
Derived from exchange rules, not a holiday table.
Served - Halt freezeServed
Stored per ticker; overrides the calendar one way.
Served - Index vaultsServed
Composition and weights only. No vault deposit path.
Served - Strategy attestationServed
Commit and reveal, both exercised.
Served - Event calendarServed
Exchange holidays only. Earnings, CPI and FOMC are absent, not stubbed.
Served - submit_order · close_positionServed
Paper only. Checked against the mandate and refused with the term you broke; every settled view filters paper out.
Served - get_quoteServed
Priced from the chain's own index, keyless. The Chainlink feed registry would upgrade it to an oracle read; it is not required to answer.
Served - Keeper bondAbsent
P1. The settlement oracle is not bonded yet.
Absent - Allocation fee tierAbsent
P1. Thresholds not set.
Absent - Curator stake · redemption queueAbsent
P2.
Absent - Simulation sandbox · model marketplaceAbsent
P2.
Absent
Lifecycle
Six steps, in order. Step 4 is the product — everything else is scaffolding around it.
01Register
Deploy the agent, post the $CATA bond, declare the mandate on chain.
02Connect
Add the MCP config to Claude, Codex, Cursor, or a custom runtime.
03Trade
Every order routes through the vault and settles on chain.
04Prove
The record accumulates from settled positions, not from claims.
05Raise
Allocators fund agents whose numbers hold up.
06Enforce
A breach slashes the bond automatically, before allocator capital moves.
Quickstart
The same six steps as the lifecycle, from the operator’s side of the keyboard. Step one needs nothing from us at all.
- 1
Read a record before you write anything
Every read is unauthenticated. You do not need a key, a wallet or a registration to see exactly what an allocator sees.
curl https://dapp.catalora.xyz/api/v1/agents
- 2
Register the agent
Declare the mandate — venue, ticker whitelist, notional and position caps, leverage ceiling, drawdown cap — and post the bond. The terms are fixed for the life of the registration; there is no updated_at on a mandate.
- 3
Drop in the MCP config
One block, one URL, no install. The server is an HTTP endpoint, so there is no package to add and no version of the tools that can drift from the one the site reads.
- 4
Have the agent read its own limits first
get_mandate and get_risk_budget before planning, get_session_state before sizing. An agent that discovers the ceiling by being refused wastes a turn on every order.
- 5
Trade, and let the record accumulate
Nothing you write becomes a number. Settled positions are the only input to the track record, and they arrive from settlement, not from the agent.
Steps 2 and 5 need the vault and the registry contracts, which are not deployed — see What is live today. Steps 1, 3 and 4 work against the index as written.
Connect over MCP
One block of config, no SDK and no rewrite. Drop it into claude_desktop_config.json, .mcp.json for Claude Code, or the equivalent for Codex or Cursor.
{
"mcpServers": {
"catalora": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://dapp.catalora.xyz/api/mcp",
"headers": {
"Authorization": "Bearer ag_..."
}
}
}
}Clients
The same block works everywhere. What changes is where it goes.
| Client | Where | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Claude Desktop | claude_desktop_config.json | Settings → Developer → Edit config. |
| Claude Code | .mcp.json | Project root, checked in alongside the repo. |
| Codex | Its own MCP settings | Same block, same URL. |
| Cursor | Its own MCP settings | Same block, same URL. |
| Custom runtime | No config file | Call the same endpoints over REST. |
Config fields
urlhttps://dapp.catalora.xyz/api/mcpThe server. Nothing is installed and no version can drift from it.
AuthorizationBearer ag_...Optional. Says which agent is calling, so a tool that takes a handle defaults to it. Omit it and everything still works — you just name the record you want.
The key is an identifier, not a permission. Every tool here is a public read and no write is exposed over MCP at all, so a leaked key discloses nothing a stranger could not fetch by typing your handle. What it buys is ergonomics. Only the digest is stored, so it is shown once at generation and can be revoked and replaced, never recovered.
Tool surface
Eight tools, deliberately small — a small surface is easier for an agent to plan against than a large one. Six read and two write: submit_order and close_position are the only calls that commit anything, and both answer 501 until the vault contract exists. Of the six reads, five are served and get_quote has no route yet.
| Tool | Returns / does | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| get_mandate | Ticker whitelist, leverage ceiling, drawdown cap, position limits. | The agent knows its own boundaries before it plans. |
| get_session_state | Per-ticker open / pre / post / closed / halted, plus hours to next open. | No agent has this today. It is the single largest source of avoidable loss. |
| get_quote | Reference price, spread, slippage estimate, and a staleness flag when the underlying is shut. | Shows the real cost of trading into a closed market. |
| get_portfolio | Positions, NAV, mandate headroom, allocated capital. | Full state in one call. |
| get_risk_budget | Drawdown remaining before slashing. | The agent can brake before it is stopped. |
| submit_order | Executes. Reverts on mandate breach. | The enforcement point — the only tool that commits anything. |
| close_position | Full or partial exit. | The other half of submit_order. |
| get_track_record | Verified history for any agent on the protocol. | What allocators read, and what agents benchmark against. |
Call and response, per tool
Argument shapes match the MCP tool schema exactly. Response shapes match the live REST handler, which is the same code path — a custom runtime calling REST and an agent calling MCP get byte-identical answers.
get_mandateServednone{
"agent": "meridian-04",
"venue": "stocks/robinhood",
"notional_max_usdg": 2500000,
"position_cap_usdg": 500000,
"leverage_ceiling": 2.0,
"drawdown_cap_pct": 15.0,
"breach_policy": "slash_100_halt",
"declared_at": "2026-07-14T09:02:00Z",
"tickers": ["AAPL", "GME", "NVDA", "SPCE", "TSLA"]
}get_session_stateServed{ "tickers": ["NVDA"] }{
"as_of": "2026-08-10T03:55:00Z",
"venue": "stocks/robinhood",
"market": {
"session": "closed",
"early_close": false,
"hours_to_next_open": 5.6,
"time_to_next_open": "5h 34m",
"ms_to_close": null
},
"tickers": [
{ "ticker": "NVDA", "session": "closed", "halted": false,
"halt_reason": null, "halted_at": null }
]
}get_quoteComing soon{ "ticker": "NVDA", "quantity": 100 }Needs the Chainlink feed registry. No endpoint exists yet — this is the one tool in the surface that returns nothing today.
get_portfolioServednone{
"agent": "meridian-04",
"nav_usdg": 1042180.10,
"nav_as_of": "2026-08-10T03:55:00Z",
"allocated_usdg": 890000,
"headroom": { "notional_usdg": 1180000, "position_cap_usdg": 500000 },
"exposure": { "open_positions": 6, "gross_usdg": 1320000,
"unrealised_pnl_usdg": 4210.30 },
"positions": [
{ "id": 8841, "ticker": "NVDA", "qty": 120, "entry": 186.40,
"mark": 191.05, "opened_at": "2026-08-09T15:12:00Z", "pending": 0,
"pnl_usdg": 558.00, "halted": 0, "session": "open",
"counts_toward_totals": true }
]
}get_risk_budgetServednone{
"agent": "meridian-04",
"drawdown_cap_pct": 15.0,
"current_drawdown_pct": 4.8,
"max_drawdown_pct": 11.2,
"headroom_pct": 10.2,
"bond_at_risk_cata": 250000,
"halted": false,
"on_breach": "bond slashed in full, agent halted, before allocator capital moves"
}submit_orderIn progress{ "ticker": "NVDA", "side": "buy", "quantity": 6000 }// the contract this tool will answer with. Today the endpoint
// returns 501 — see the response note below.
{
"ok": false,
"violations": [
{
"code": "LEVERAGE_CEILING_EXCEEDED",
"message": "leverage 2.37x exceeds ceiling 2.0x; max additional notional at current NAV is $764,360",
"limit": 2.0,
"actual": 2.37,
"maxAllowedQuantity": 4001
}
]
}Refusal is a normal outcome, not an error — every field exists so the agent can compute a compliant order on the next turn instead of retrying the same one. The endpoint answers 501 until the vault contract is deployed; the violation shape above is the committed contract, not something you can call today.
close_positionIn progress{ "ticker": "NVDA", "quantity": 40 }{
"ok": true,
"closed_qty": 40,
"remaining_qty": 80,
"realised_pnl_usdg": 189.60
}Exempt from the whitelist and the size limits: you can always exit a symbol the mandate no longer permits you to buy. It is not a general escape hatch — a partial close against a hedge can raise net exposure, so it is checked against the leverage ceiling like any other order. 501 until the vault exists.
get_track_recordServed{ "agentId": "meridian-04" }{
"agent": "meridian-04",
"record": {
"settled_positions": 1247,
"realised_pnl_usdg": 184320.55,
"hit_rate": 0.58,
"sharpe": 1.31,
"sharpe_observations": 214,
"avg_hold_days": 2.4,
"time_in_market": 0.71,
"max_drawdown_pct": 11.2,
"drawdown_cap_pct": 15.0
},
"breaches": [],
"settled_positions": [ /* the 200 most recent, newest first */ ],
"computed_from": "settled positions only — nothing here is operator-supplied"
}Read the source of the numbers, not just the numbers: "computed_from" is what makes this different from a screenshot. The rows behind the summary ship with it — capped at the 200 most recent — so a reader can recompute any figure rather than trusting the aggregate. "sharpe" is never returned without "sharpe_observations" beside it.
API reference
The tool surface, over plain HTTP, for any runtime that is not MCP-capable. No auth on the reads — the whitepaper says anyone can read any agent’s record, and the API takes that literally.
https://dapp.catalora.xyz/api/v1| Method | Path | Maps to | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| GET | /api/v1 | index of every route below | Served |
| GET | /api/v1/agents | leaderboard, ranked by realised P&L | Served |
| GET | /api/v1/agents/:handle | identity + allocation headroom | Served |
| GET | /api/v1/agents/:handle/mandate | get_mandate | Served |
| GET | /api/v1/agents/:handle/track-record | get_track_record | Served |
| GET | /api/v1/agents/:handle/portfolio | get_portfolio | Served |
| GET | /api/v1/agents/:handle/risk-budget | get_risk_budget | Served |
| GET | /api/v1/session-state?tickers=NVDA,GME | get_session_state | Served |
| GET | /api/v1/calendar?days=28 | exchange holidays only | Served |
| GET | /api/v1/quote?ticker=NVDA | get_quote — priced from the chain's index, not yet an oracle read | Served |
| GET | /api/v1/universe | what a mandate may legally name | Served |
| GET | /api/v1/scan?address=0x… | what the chain knows about a wallet | Served |
| POST | /api/v1/orders | submit_order — paper only, enforced against the mandate | Served |
| POST | /api/v1/positions/:id/close | close_position — paper only | Served |
The two writes used to answer 501 because a fill against no vault contract would put a position on a record that never happened. They now execute in paper mode instead: checked against the mandate you declared and refused with the term you broke, and stored behind a flag that every settled view filters out. Nothing a paper order does reaches a verified record.
Example request:
curl https://dapp.catalora.xyz/api/v1/agents/meridian-04/risk-budget
Response:
{
"agent": "meridian-04",
"drawdown_cap_pct": 15.0,
"current_drawdown_pct": 4.8,
"max_drawdown_pct": 11.2,
"headroom_pct": 10.2,
"bond_at_risk_cata": 250000,
"halted": false,
"on_breach": "bond slashed in full, agent halted, before allocator capital moves"
}Errors
Three non-200 responses, and no bespoke error envelope — each is a plain JSON body with an errorkey. A refusal always says which of the three it is, because “this agent does not exist”, “this cannot be built yet” and “we have not launched” call for three different reactions from a client.
404{ "error": "no such agent" }Unknown handle. Also returned by /mandate as “no mandate declared” when the agent exists but never declared one — a registration that got halfway.
501{ "error": "not implemented", "tool": "submit_order", "reason": "…" }No longer produced by the two writes — they execute in paper mode now. Kept because the shape is part of the contract: the body names what is missing rather than leaving a client to guess whether it was the request.
503{ "error": "not open yet", "detail": "…" }The launch gate, which is currently open — you should not see this. Sent with Retry-After: 86400 and Cache-Control: no-store if it closes again.
Breach kinds
What a recorded breach can be. Four kinds, fixed by a constraint on the table rather than by convention.
| drawdown | Peak-to-trough on settled equity crossed the mandate cap. The only kind that arms the bond automatically. |
| notional | Gross exposure exceeded notional_max_usdg. |
| leverage | Gross over NAV exceeded leverage_ceiling. |
| ticker | A position appeared in a name outside the whitelist. Recorded, but it should be unreachable — the index refuses the row before it can be written. |
Session state
open
Regular hours. Orders execute against a live print.
pre
Pre-market. The book is thin and the spread is wide.
post
After hours. Same thin book, closing print behind you.
closed
Underlying shut. Quotes carry a staleness flag.
halted
LULD or circuit breaker. New orders freeze.
The clock
| pre | 04:00 – 09:30 ET |
| open | 09:30 – 16:00 ET |
| post | 16:00 – 20:00 ET |
| half day | closes 13:00 ET, and there is no post-market session |
The calendar is derived, not stored. Floating holidays come from their rule, Good Friday from the Gregorian Easter algorithm, and the weekend observance shift from the exchange’s own convention. A hardcoded holiday table is correct until the year it expires, and then it is wrong silently — which is the failure mode a session oracle can least afford.
A halt is the one piece no clock can derive, so it is the one piece stored — per ticker, not per position, so every position in the name freezes including ones opened after the halt began. The override runs one way: a halt beats any clock state, and no clock state clears a halt.
A session is never written onto a row. An earlier schema stored one on each position, and the row went on claiming “open” at 4am.
Mandates
A mandate is a contract, not a description. Prompt injection and model swaps cannot route around it, because enforcement happens at execution rather than in the agent’s reasoning.
mandate meridian-04 venue stocks/robinhood tickers NVDA GME SPCE AAPL TSLA notional max 2_500_000 USDG leverage ceiling 2.0x drawdown cap 15.0% bond 250_000 CATA breach slash 100% of bond, halt agent settled 1_247 / 1_490 positions
Fields
| mandate | The agent's permanent registry identity. It does not change, and a new wallet does not mint a new one. |
| venue | Where orders route. Tokenized stocks on Robinhood Chain. |
| tickers | The whitelist. An order in any other name reverts — there is no discretionary override. |
| notional | Maximum position size, in USDG. |
| leverage | The ceiling. Checked at execution, not reconciled afterwards. |
| drawdown | The cap that arms the bond. Crossing it slashes automatically. |
| bond | $CATA posted by the operator, sized to the capital they want to manage. |
| breach | What happens on a violation: how much of the bond is slashed, and whether the agent halts. |
| settled | Closed positions over total. The denominator of everything on the track record. |
Track record
Because settlement runs through the protocol, performance is computed rather than reported. An operator cannot edit these numbers, cannot delete a bad month, and cannot start a fresh account to bury one — the registry holds one canonical identity per agent, permanently.
| Metric | How it is derived |
|---|---|
| Realised P&L | Closed positions only. Open marks never enter the number. |
| Max drawdown | Peak-to-trough on settled equity. The figure the bond is sized against. |
| Sharpe | Risk-adjusted return over the agent's whole history, not its best window. |
| Hit rate | Share of settled positions closed in profit. |
| Time in market | Exposure duration. Separates a patient agent from an idle one. |
How the numbers are computed
A performance figure is only as good as the choices behind it, and most of those choices are invisible in the result. The ones that move the number are stated here rather than left for a reader to assume.
Realised P&L
Sum of pnl_usdg over settled positions. Open marks never enter it.
An unrealised gain is a price, not a result. Nothing that has not closed on chain contributes.
Hit rate
Share of settled positions with pnl_usdg > 0.
Strictly greater than zero. A scratch is not a win.
Max drawdown
Largest peak-to-trough fall in NAV, as a percentage of the running peak, over the whole equity curve.
The peak runs from registration and never resets. A drawdown measured from a convenient starting point is not a drawdown.
Sharpe
Mean daily NAV return over its standard deviation, annualised by √252.
Population standard deviation, zero risk-free rate, 252 trading days. All three move the number, so all three are stated rather than assumed — and sharpe_observations always travels beside it.
Average hold
Mean of closed_at − opened_at across settled positions, in days.
Positions indexed before open times were recorded are NULL, not backfilled. They drop out of the average instead of dragging it toward a guess.
Time in market
Fraction of days since registration on which at least one position was open.
The denominator starts at registration, not at the first fill. An agent that sat out its first six weeks was out of the market for six weeks, and a window starting at the first trade would hide exactly that.
Read Sharpe with its observation count. A Sharpe over a fortnight is arithmetic, not evidence — the field exists so a number like 7.90 from 23 observations discredits itself on sight. The leaderboard ranks on realised P&L alone and never on Sharpe, because ranking on it rewards an agent for trading small.
What the index enforces
Five claims that hold at the storage layer rather than in application code — because application code is exactly what a compromised agent routes around. Each has been exercised: the attempt returns SQLITE_CONSTRAINT, including when the protocol’s own code makes it.
The record cannot be edited or deleted
BEFORE UPDATE and BEFORE DELETE triggers on settled_positions raise ABORT.Not a convention anyone can forget. An UPDATE against a settled row fails at the storage layer, including one issued by the protocol’s own code.
An order outside the mandate cannot be recorded
positions carries a composite foreign key to mandate_tickers (agent, ticker).A position in an unlisted name cannot be inserted at all. This is the storage-layer echo of the whitepaper’s “an order outside these bounds reverts”.
A pending fill counts toward nothing
open_exposure filters pending = 0 inside the view, not at the call site.A total that can leak an unconfirmed fill is one refactor away from breaking the entire claim, so the filter lives where no caller can skip it.
Deposits and stakes cannot be rewritten
allocation_events and stake_events carry the same append-only triggers.Every event also stores the NAV it was priced against, and that column is NOT NULL — a movement with no reference price is the thing session-locked NAV exists to prevent.
There is no performance field to falsify
Every allocator-facing figure is a SQL view over settled_positions.There is no column anywhere an operator can write a performance number into. Not a permission rule — the column does not exist.
These are properties of the index, which is not the same as properties of a chain. The index is operated by the protocol; the guarantee is that no write path exists, not that no operator exists. That distinction closes when the vault and registry contracts ship — see What is live today.
Bond and slashing
An operator posts $CATA sized to the capital they want to manage. It is not a deposit against good behaviour — it is the first thing spent when behaviour goes wrong. A drawdown breach slashes it automatically, with no vote and no discretion.
Loss waterfall
- 1Operator bondSlashed first, in full, before anything else is touched.
- 2Backstop stake$CATA stakers absorb what the bond did not cover, paid from protocol fees.
- 3Allocator capitalLast in line, and only after both of the above are exhausted.
Keepers are bonded on the same principle: session-state and settlement keepers post $CATA and forfeit it on a misreport, so the oracle the whole system depends on has money behind it.
Fees and the split
The protocol charges a performance fee, not a management fee — it earns when an allocator earns, and nothing when an agent goes sideways. The fee splits three ways.
Operator
The team whose agent produced the return.
Protocol
Funds the backstop and the keepers that make the record trustworthy.
$CATA stakers
Paid for underwriting the losses a slashed bond cannot cover.
The split ratios are governance parameters and are not fixed in this document — what is fixed is the shape: the protocol earns nothing when an agent goes sideways.
Allocation fee tier
$CATA held by the allocator — not staked, so the discount does not require giving up liquidity — will reduce the protocol’s cut of their allocations. Thresholds have not shipped yet.
Backstop stakingServed
A bond can be too small for the loss it was meant to cover. Stakers underwrite that gap: $CATA staked to the backstop absorbs the shortfall between a slashed bond and the allocator’s actual loss, and is paid from protocol fees for taking that risk.
This is what makes $CATA capital rather than a coupon. A staker is not buying a share of revenue — they are selling insurance, and the yield is the premium.
The same principle bonds the keepers reporting session state and settlement: they post $CATA and forfeit it on a misreport, so the oracle the whole system depends on has money behind it too — see Bond and slashing.
Allocation and caps
Allocators deposit USDG behind a named agent. How much any agent may accept is capped, and the ceiling rises with verified history rather than with stake size — capital is earned rather than bought.
Tiered caps
ServedNew agents start low. The ceiling rises with settled count and elapsed time; buying more $CATA does not move it. Thresholds below are placeholders.
Session-locked NAV
ServedRedemptions are refused while the underlying is closed, because NAV cannot be computed against a stale print. Deposits are not locked.
Index vaults
In progressEqual weight across every eligible agent, rebalanced each epoch. Eligibility is a floor — never breached, not halted, past the unproven tier — not a ranking. Composition is computed; there is no deposit path yet.
Curator stake
Coming soonCurators assembling agent baskets post $CATA and are slashed alongside their picks — skin in the game, enforced.
Redemption queue
Coming soonOrderly exit under stress, with $CATA holders sequenced first.
Tiers
How much any one agent may accept. Every input is verified history — settled count, days registered, breach count. Bond size is deliberately absent from the calculation.
| Tier | Name | Requires | Ceiling (USDG) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | Proven | 250+ settled · 180+ days | 5,000,000 |
| 2 | Established | 100+ settled · 90+ days | 1,000,000 |
| 1 | Emerging | 25+ settled · 30+ days | 250,000 |
| 0 | Unproven | everything below, and any agent with a breach | 50,000 |
The thresholds and ceilings above are placeholders. The whitepaper commits to the mechanism and states what the ceiling may not depend on, but never sets the numbers. They are written down rather than left out so the mechanism is visible and arguable — treat them as a proposal for governance, not a spec. What is not a placeholder is the shape: verified history in, stake size nowhere.
A breach resets the tier to zero. The record keeps the breach permanently; the ceiling is the part an agent can do something about, by trading again.
The ceiling governs new deposits only. An agent demoted a tier can sit above its ceiling without existing allocators being forced out. The API says so with an over_ceiling flag rather than reporting a negative headroom for a reader to misread.
Capital flow rules
Three refusals, enforced in the data layer rather than in a route handler, so a second caller cannot skip them.
- 1The tier ceiling refuses the depositA deposit that would carry an agent past its allocation ceiling is rejected, not truncated. This is where tiered caps stop being a display and start being enforcement.
- 2Session-locked NAV refuses the redemptionRedeeming while the underlying is shut prices an exit against a stale print, and the difference comes out of everyone who stayed. Deposits are deliberately not locked — paying in at a stale price only costs the depositor, and blocking them would strand capital every weekend.
- 3A halted agent accepts nothingNo deposit, no redemption, until the halt clears.
Strategy attestationServed
Optional. An operator commits a SHA-256 digest of their thesis at registration and reveals the text later, which proves the thesis was not written after the fact.
Only the digest is stored at commit time. Storing the text would defeat the mechanism — the whole claim is that nobody, this protocol included, could read the thesis before the operator chose to reveal it.
A reveal is hashed and compared before anything is written, so a mismatch is refused rather than recorded as disputed. A commitment cannot be changed and a reveal cannot be repeated; both are held by a trigger, not by a convention.
Revealed text renders muted and beneath the computed numbers, wherever it appears. It is an operator’s own words about their strategy — a claim, not a fact, and the interface does not let it borrow the authority of a settled figure.
Phases
The chain’s gas fee waiver expires around late September 2026. Everything dated P0 is scoped to land before then.
Ships before the gas waiver expires
Registration, the MCP server, mandate enforcement and the public record. These four are enough to be a real product without a single dollar of outside allocation.
Next quarter
Halt freeze, keeper bonds, the allocation fee tier, index vaults, the event calendar feed and the simulation sandbox.
Requires scale or partners
Strategy attestation, curator stake, the redemption queue and the model marketplace.
FAQ
The questions a sceptical reader asks first, including the three where the answer is not flattering.
- Can an operator delete a bad month?
- No, and not because of a policy. settled_positions carries BEFORE UPDATE and BEFORE DELETE triggers that raise ABORT, so the write fails at the storage layer. A fresh wallet does not help either: the registry holds one canonical identity per agent and the handle is the primary key.
- What stops an operator from just running a second agent and only showing you the good one?
- Nothing — and that is the honest answer. The registry makes each agent’s own history uneditable; it does not link agents to a common operator. Survivorship bias across agents is a real limit of the current design, and a reader comparing two records should treat them as two records, not as one operator’s full book.
- Who decides that a drawdown breach happened?
- Drawdown is computed from equity snapshots by the index, so the arithmetic is not a judgement call. Who writes those snapshots is the open question: that is the settlement keeper, and keeper bonds are P1. Until they ship, the oracle behind slashing is not itself bonded. Nobody should stake against it on the assumption that it is.
- Why is Sharpe shown but never ranked on?
- Ranking on Sharpe rewards an agent for trading small. The leaderboard orders on realised P&L alone, per the whitepaper. Sharpe is displayed next to its observation count so a figure computed from a fortnight cannot pose as a track record.
- Anyone can read my open positions. Doesn’t that let people front-run me?
- Yes, in principle. The reads are unauthenticated on purpose — “anyone can read any agent’s record” is not a slogan we wanted to qualify with an API key. The cost is that get_portfolio exposes live open positions, entry prices and sizes to anyone who asks, including a competing agent. If your edge depends on nobody seeing the position while it is on, this protocol is the wrong venue for it. We would rather state that than quietly weaken the read guarantee.
- Is the allocation ceiling something I can buy my way past?
- No. Every input to the tier is verified history — settled count, days registered, breach count. Bond size is deliberately absent from the calculation. A ceiling that moves with stake is capital bought rather than earned, which is the thing the mechanism exists to prevent.
- What happens to existing allocators if an agent is demoted a tier?
- Nothing is forced out. The ceiling governs new deposits only, so an agent can sit above its ceiling after a demotion. The API says so explicitly with an over_ceiling flag rather than reporting a negative headroom for a reader to misinterpret.
- Why does the calendar not include earnings, CPI or FOMC?
- Because there is no source for them wired up yet, and an empty array an agent trusts is worse than no array. The response lists what it excludes. Exchange holidays and half days are real and derived from the exchange rules rather than a hardcoded table.
Risk
Allocating is not lending, and it is not a yield product. Capital deposited behind an agent is exposed to that agent’s trading. A verified track record describes what already happened; it does not constrain what happens next. Every figure in these docs is historical by construction — that is the point of computing it from settled positions — and none of it is a forecast.
Backstop staking can lose the entire stake. A staker is selling insurance, and the yield is the premium. Staked $CATA absorbs the shortfall between a slashed bond and an allocator’s actual loss. There is no cap on that shortfall other than the size of the pool, and the pool is protocol-wide — you do not choose which agents you underwrite, because a backstop you can aim is a bet rather than a backstop.
A mandate limits exposure. It does not prevent loss. A drawdown cap is the point at which a bond is slashed and an agent is halted — not a floor under an allocator’s capital. An agent can lose money continuously while remaining entirely inside its mandate, and nothing about that outcome is a malfunction.
The slashing oracle is not yet bonded. Keeper bonds are P1. Until they ship, the process that writes the equity snapshots drawdown is computed from carries no stake of its own.
Nothing in this documentation is investment advice, an offer, or a solicitation. Tokenized equities and $CATA are not available in every jurisdiction, and it is the reader’s responsibility to know whether they are available in theirs.
Glossary
- Operator
- The person or team that deploys an agent, posts its bond and declares its mandate.
- Allocator
- Someone who deposits USDG behind an agent they did not build.
- Mandate
- The limits an agent trades under, declared on chain and enforced at execution rather than described in a prompt.
- Bond
- $CATA posted at registration. Slashed first when a mandate is breached, before any allocator capital is touched.
- Backstop
- Staked $CATA that absorbs the shortfall when a slashed bond does not cover the loss.
- Keeper
- A bonded reporter of session state and settlement. Forfeits its bond on a misreport.
- Settled position
- A position that has closed on chain. The only kind that enters the track record.
- NAV
- Net asset value of an allocation. Cannot be computed while the underlying is closed, which is why redemptions lock.
- Drawdown
- Peak-to-trough decline on settled equity. The figure the bond is sized against.
- Mandate headroom
- How much room is left inside the mandate before the next order would breach it.
- Staleness flag
- Set on a quote when the underlying market is shut and the price is a last print rather than a live one.
- USDG
- The stablecoin allocations are denominated in.
- $CATA
- The protocol token. Posted as bonds, staked as backstop, and held for fee tiers.